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in Canada, Germany, Spain, Switzerland and the United States. In Australia and especially Italy, other factors appear to have played a particularly important role in shaping homeownership patterns.
• On average, population ageing has boosted the aggregate homeownership rate by ¾-1 percentage point among the countries analysed, with the effect being particularly noticeable in Switzerland, Germany, Denmark and Canada. Changes in real household incomes have had more varied impacts, boosting aggregate homeownership rates by more than 1½ percentage point in Canada, Denmark, and Finland, while having negligible effects on the evolution of homeownership rates in Germany and other continental European countries. In comparison, shifts in household size and structure have -on average -exerted a modest downward influence on aggregate homeownership rates, although this effect varies somewhat across the countries studied. Finally, an increase in the share of immigrant (and ethnic minority) households has tempered the rise in aggregate homeownership rates in some countries.
• A significant proportion of the change in aggregate homeownership rates is, however, not explained by changes in the characteristics of the population, signalling a possible shift in the relative attractiveness of owner-occupied housing over recent decades and the possible influence of public policy settings:
-The relaxation of down-payment constraints on mortgage loans has increased homeownership rates among credit-constrained, lower-income households. The estimated contribution of such mortgage market innovations to the change in aggregate homeownership rates is broadly comparable with the impact of population ageing.
-Policies such as mortgage interest deductibility tend to be regressive since the probability of homeownership rises with income. The results indicate that such tax relief may distort the impact of other policies and potentially crowd-out financially constrained households from homeownership via house price capitalisation effects.
-Rent regulations and provisions for tenure security implicitly impact homeownership by making renting more attractive. Nevertheless, rental market regulations may impose costs, to the extent that they are capitalised into housing costs, reduce the supply of rental housing and increase rigidity in the housing market, with possible adverse consequences for residential mobility.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 1 discusses the link between homeownership and public policy in OECD countries, while Section 2 documents trends in homeownership rates in selected OECD countries and discusses some potential drivers of these trends. Section 3 outlines the empirical strategies used in the paper. It first describes the decomposition technique adopted to isolate the contribution of shifts in household characteristics to the change in aggregate homeownership rates. It then outlines the cross-country panel framework used to analyse the effect of mortgage market innovations and tax policies on homeownership rates. It finally specifies the crosssectional model used to investigate the potential link between rental market regulations and tenure choice. Section 4 discusses the results of the effects of non-policy factors in homeownership rates, while Section 5 discusses the results on the influence of public policy on homeownership rates. The last section concludes.
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Homeownership and public policy in OECD countries
Public policy in OECD countries tends to favour homeownership relative to renting and other investments, via the preferential tax treatment of owner-occupied housing. For example, while mortgage interest costs are tax deductible in many OECD countries, few countries tax imputed rent and those that do often substantially under-estimate the rental value. 2 Moreover, while property tax is often viewed as a substitute for taxation of imputed rent, the magnitude of the tax is rarely sufficient to offset the subsidy provided by mortgage interest deductibility.
The main economic argument for subsidising homeownership is that ownership may give rise to positive spillovers for society, although the case for subsidising homeownership is far from clear (see Box 1). In some instances, it is likely that homeownership is mistakenly attributed a causal influence for outcomes that are actually due to unobserved individual or household characteristics (Dietz and Haurin, 2003) . For example, it is typically argued that children of homeowners perform better at school than those of renters. But this finding may simply reflect the impact of unobserved factors, such as the possibility that parents with a view to the longer term may be more likely to purchase a home and invest in their children. Nevertheless, focusing too closely on such identification issues may unduly divert attention from the broader idea that homeownership provides the most stable tenure arrangement to satisfy basic household needs -a plausible hypothesis that does not necessarily lend itself to econometric verification.
Whether it is due to the household needs hypothesis or a causal interpretation of the associations discussed in Box 1 the notion that public policy should favour homeownership over renting is active in many OECD countries. This economic rationale has sometimes been reinforced by a tendency to liken owner-occupation to the attainment of a "national dream". Accordingly, many OECD governments pursue higher rates of homeownership -implicitly or explicitly -as a public policy goal. Therefore, understanding the drivers of aggregate homeownership rates is important from the perspective of public policy.
Box 1. The Economic Benefits and Costs of Homeownership
The main economic argument for subsidising owner occupation is that homeownership may give rise to positive spillovers for society. While the literature has identified many possible spillovers, this box focuses on four key areas: wealth accumulation, child outcomes, social capital and mobility. 1 There is competing evidence for each hypothesis and a common problem is establishing causality since any correlation between homeownership and a variable of interest (e.g. wealth) may simply reflect the influence of a third omitted factor. The veracity of the arguments may also hinge on other policy settings and circumstances in a country.
A Vehicle for Asset/Wealth Accumulation:
For myopic households, homeownership -to the extent that it creates an orientation towards the future (Sherraden 1991; OECD, 2003) -may result in a higher rate of wealth accumulation than otherwise. The act of taking out mortgage debt may also prompt a change in household spending behaviour, by making households pre-commit themselves to a scheme that is costly to break. However, the effectiveness of using one's house as a means of forced savings has weakened considerably over recent decades, given the increased prominence of housing equity withdrawal and mortgage refinancing (Li and Yang, 2010) .
With the move away from publicly-funded retirement systems, homeownership is playing an increasingly important role in maintaining the standard of living of households in retirement. In Australia, the incidence of poverty amongst older households is very high according to conventional measures, but 211 Box 1. The Economic Benefits and Costs of Homeownership (cont.) falls dramatically once implicit rents are taken into account (Yates and Bradbury, 2009 ). Hirayama (2010) makes a similar argument with respect to Japan.
Against this, buying a house entails higher transaction costs than renting (Haurin and Gill, 2002) making it an illiquid investment. The timing of the purchase also tends to matter, especially given the volatility of housing prices. Indeed, recent experience in the United States highlights that policies that promote homeownership can have adverse consequences for mobility to the extent that they have been associated with a rise in negative equity (Ferreira et al. 2008; Caldera Sánchez and Andrews, 2011) .
Better Outcomes for Children:
Homeownership has been linked to better outcomes for children in terms of test scores and behaviour . This may reflect the added geographic stability and improved home environment associated with homeownership compared with renting. It is unclear, however, whether the positive correlation between homeownership and child outcomes is causal. This may reflect the fact that in some datasets, family wealth is not measured. To the extent that family wealth affects both the likelihood of becoming a homeowner and child test scores, studies based on such datasets will overstate the impact of homeownership on child school performance (Dietz and Haurin, 2003) . Even when family wealth is measured, however, unobserved parental characteristics are likely to confound the analysis. Green and White (1997) present an example where there are two types of parents -investors and non-investors. Since this characteristic of parents is unlikely to be observed, any estimate of the impact of homeownership on child test scores will be upwardly biased if investor-type parents are more likely to purchase a home and invest in their children. 2 3. Community Engagement and Voting Behaviour: Homeownership tends to be associated with more active and informed citizens (Di Pasquale and Glaeser, 1999 ) and more residentially stable neighbourhoods. Homeowners might be more likely to make political choices that favour the long-run health of their community (such as more investment in green space, see Richer, 1996) , while renters have an incentive to favour policies bringing immediate benefits relative to long-run gains. However, the positive impact of homeownership on political engagement may be over-stated due to endogeneity bias -people who are more likely to participate in community activities may also be more likely to be homeowners (Englehardt et al. 2010) .
Against this, homeowners have an incentive to restrict new supply -through support for zoning and land-use regulations -in order to raise house prices, which is likely to impose costs on outsiders (Glaeser and Shapiro, 2003; Hilber and Robert-Nicoud, 2010) .
Homeownership Adversely Affects Labour Mobility:
Labour mobility is lower and thus unemployment higher among owner-occupants than renters because of the high transaction cost of moving (Oswald 1996; Caldera Sánchez and Andrews, 2011) . Of course, there are also costs associated with residential mobility. Hanusek et al. (2004) show that student turnover, particularly student entry during the school year, reduces achievement gain, and the effects are felt by everyone in the school, not just those who themselves move.
1. It has also been argued that homeowners take better care of their property (Di Pasquale and Glaeser, 1999) , and are both happier (Rossi and Weber, 1996) and healthier (Benzeval and Judge, 1996) . However, the extent to which this relationship is causal is unclear and the true relationship could, in fact, be negative if homeowners face greater anxiety due to their increased financial obligations (Nettleton and Burrows, 1998 ). 2. It should also be noted that the money spent on owner-occupied housing investment might crowd-out other family-specific investments that have a more direct payoff to children's outcomes (Aaronson, 2000) . For example, Currie and Yelowitz (1998) argue that public housing has a positive effect on school retention because subsidised housing allows money to be directed to other family needs.
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2. Evolution and potential drivers of homeownership rates in selected OECD countries may partly reflect demographic trends, and in particular, the increase in the average age in OECD countries over recent decades. Population ageing affects the aggregate homeownership rate because older people have higher rates of homeownership than younger people. Across OECD countries, the probability of homeownership rises significantly between 25 and 44 years of age -the family formation years -and tends to peak in the 55-64 age bracket (see Figure 1 ). This implies that aggregate homeownership rates in OECD countries would have increased over recent decades because of ageing populations, even if nothing else changed.
The tendency for homeownership rates to change within age brackets over time, however, suggests that more is going on than just compositional effects ( Figure 1 ). While homeownership rates within income quartiles have also changed over time (see Figure 2) , homeownership rates may have also been affected by shifts in underlying household structure, such as the deferral of marriage and childbearing and the rise of single-parent households. Changes in education attainment, which may proxy for wealth and/or permanent income, may also matter.
Mortgage markets are also likely to be important since owner-occupied housing constitutes a household's single largest financial outlay, and generally requires debt financing. Housing finance markets have changed drastically over recent decades, 213 reflecting a wave of financial deregulation motivated by broader economic efficiency goals.
There has been considerable cross-country variation in the timing of reform and the extent to which the financial sector was regulated in the earlier period (Abiad et al. 2008; Andrews, 2010) . These changes in financial market regulation have significantly lowered borrowing costs for housing, resulting in a substantial expansion in the supply of mortgage loans in many countries (ECB, 2009a; Ellis, 2006) , with potential implications for homeownership
rates.
An important consequence of mortgage market deregulation was to significantly reduce deposit requirements, thereby easing the down-payment constraint for many households wishing to become homeowners. 4 The down-payment constraint tends to be particularly binding for financially-constrained households, especially younger households who have had less time to accumulate a deposit. Previous empirical research
shows that from the late 1970s until the early 1990s, homeownership rates among younger households tended to increase more in those countries where the maximum loan-to-value (LTV) ratio rose, implying a reduction in the down-payment constraint (Chiuri and Jappelli, 2003) . 5 While the maximum permissible LTV has risen in many OECD countries since the 1990s, important cross-country differences remain (see Andrews et al., 2011). 6 Cross-country differences in homeownership rates may also reflect differences in the tax treatment of housing. The wedge between the market interest rate and the debt financing cost of housing (the after-tax interest rate) provides one indicator of the extent to which the tax system favours owner-occupied housing with respect to debt financing (see Johansson, 2011) . While this simplified measure is imperfect, it nevertheless serves as a useful indicator since households generally finance their house purchase with debt. 7
According to this indicator, tax relief is most generous in the Netherlands and effectively zero in countries where mortgage loans are not tax favoured (Figure 3 ).
The impact of tax relief on mortgage-debt-financing costs on homeownership, however, is unclear. One reason for this is that such tax relief generally takes the form of a deduction against earned income rather than a credit and, thus, are worth more to highincome earners . To the extent that homeownership rates amongst high income earners in countries that do not allow mortgage interest deductibility (e.g. Australia) are still relatively high, it is likely that these households would still be homeowners in absence of the subsidy (Figure 2) . 8 This suggests that such tax reliefs have little effect on aggregate homeownership rates and the effect may in fact be negative, if tax reliefs get capitalised into real house prices (Capozza et al. 1996; Andrews, 2010) and make homeownership less affordable for lower income households than otherwise (Bourassa and Yin, 2007; Hilber and Turner, 2010) .
Finally, the paper analyses the impact of rental market regulations on homeownership, though the focus is on explaining cross sectional differences in homeownership -as opposed to changes over time -due to data constraints. Two specific measures of rental market regulations -rent control and security of tenure -based on a recent OECD Housing Questionnaire are adopted. (2003) Denmark (1992) Netherlands ( 
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length is freely negotiable and the extent of notice required in the event that the rental contract is terminated. According to this measure, security of tenure tends to be relatively high in Portugal and Austria, while much lower in English-speaking countries. These measures are discussed at length in Johansson (2011) , and are also utilised in and Caldera .
Empirical strategy
This section outlines the empirical frameworks used to analyse the extent to which changes in aggregate homeownership rates can be attributed to shifts in households' characteristics and public policy influences, including mortgage market innovations, tax arrangements and rental regulations. Panel estimation techniques are used to update and reassess earlier research highlighting the link between changes in down-payment constraints and homeownership rates (Chiuri and Jappelli, 2003) . Unfortunately, it is not possible -due to data limitations -to estimate the direct impact of housing tax arrangements on homeownership rates over time. Instead, the paper investigates whether the impact of financial market deregulation on homeownership rates is affected by the extent to which housing is tax advantaged. This is a natural extension to recent empirical research, which shows that housing demand shocks -such as financial deregulation -are more likely to be capitalised into real house prices in countries where tax relief on mortgage debt financing is generous (Andrews, 2010) . Finally, the paper uses the two newly constructed indicators of rent regulation and tenant protection discussed above to investigate the extent to which such policies increase the relative attractiveness of renting in a broader sample of countries (see Appendix A for details). The cross-sectional nature of this modelling, however, makes it difficult to identify the contribution of rental market regulations to changes in aggregate homeownership rates over time. Wedge increasing in the degree of tax relief 1.8
Non-policy influences on tenure choice
A variant of the Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition (Blinder, 1973; Oaxaca, 1973 ) is utilised to decompose the change in the homeownership rate into the part that can be explained by changing household characteristics -including age, household size and structure -and changing propensities for homeownership given these characteristics. While this approach is somewhat partial as it assumes that trends in homeownership rates are demand-driven, it is nonetheless useful given the interest in estimating the contribution of changing household characteristics to aggregate homeownership rates over time. The decomposition technique involves two steps. As a first step, a binomial logit regression framework is employed to model the probability of homeownership for each OECD country:
( 1) where Pr(Own = 1), or P, is the probability that a household will choose to be an owner, given the relevant household characteristics in the vector X. A transformation of equation (1) yields:
Implying that the dependent variable is the log of the odds that a particular tenure choice will be made.
In turn, to decompose the change in the homeownership rate over time (e.g. between 1994 and 2004 ) the following calculations are performed:
• The average probability of homeownership in 1994 ( ) and 2004 ( ) is calculated based on (1) setting each relevant independent variable equal to its sample mean and applying the estimated logistic coefficients.
• The decomposition of the change in the probability of homeownership (P) can be then expressed as: 9
where is a row vector of average values of the independent variables and  t is a vector of coefficient estimates for period t (where t equals 1994 or 2004). The change in the homeownership rate can be decomposed into two parts:
• Explained effect: captures the impact of shifts in household characteristics, such as age, household size and structure, household income and education.
• Unexplained/residual effect: captures changes in a household's underlying propensity to become a homeowner, holding household characteristics constant. This effect may reflect both changes in behaviour and the impact of housing policies.
The vector X includes a number of variables relevant to the decision to become a homeowner:
• The head of household's age is controlled for via a series of dummy variables covering seven age ranges (20-24, 25-29, 30-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64 and 65 and above) .
• Household size and four different household structures: couples without dependents; couples with dependents; singles without dependents and singles with dependents.
While changes in household structure will affect household size, there may also be 1994 2004 1994 2004 1994 2004 1994 2004 
changes in household size independent of household structure if families chose to have fewer children over time.
• Real household disposable income is included to capture the financial capacity to afford a down-payment and service a mortgage. 10 Educational attainment is also included, since current income may be an imperfect proxy for permanent income or wealth (Goodman, 1988) .
• Controls for health status, ethnicity, immigrant status and linguistic skills are also included, although these variables are not available for all countries.
• Dummy variables capturing the residential location of the household (e.g. state/province for large countries; city for small economies) are included, where possible, as a proxy for the relative prices of homeownership and renting.
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Since most of these variables are categorical, the specification has sufficient flexibility to control for non-linearities. In the case of the income variable, which is continuous, income-squared is included. Interactions between real income and each age bracket were also included to proxy for unobserved wealth effects, while interactions between real income and the household structure terms were included to proxy for an unobserved budget constraint (see Li, 1977) . Finally, the potential simultaneity between tenure choice and household formation decisions is not addressed. Instead, it is assumed that the decision to form a household or change a household type is made prior to the tenure choice decision, which has been a common approach in the literature (see Yates, 2000) . While this is a strong assumption, the data-intensive nature of this exercise (the modelling is repeated for 12 OECD countries) makes this potential simultaneity issue impractical to address.
Policy influences on tenure choice
After estimating the contribution of shifts in household characteristics to changes in aggregate homeownership rates, the role of selected public policies is assessed using panel and cross-section regression techniques.
Mortgage market innovations and tax policy
To estimate the impact of mortgage market innovations -specifically, changes in the down-payment constraint -on homeownership rates over time, a cross country panel model is estimated:
where I denotes country and t year. To the extent that the tenure decision of the "marginal homebuyer" will be most sensitive to changes in the down-payment constraint, the dependent variable in equation (4) is the homeownership rates of the marginal buyer. Two proxies are used to measure the marginal buyer: all households in the second income quartile and households aged 25-34 years in the second income quartile. 12 LTV is the maximum LTV ratio and Taxrelief is a time invariant variable capturing the extent of tax relief on mortgage debt financing (see Figure 3 ).
The vector Z further controls for real household income, real interest rates, price-torent ratio, real construction costs and the share of the total population aged 25-34. The homeownership rates of the remaining income/age groups (i.e. income quartiles 1, 3 and 4)
are also included in Z to control for the influence of unobserved factors on homeownership and to make the implications for the aggregate homeownership rate clearer. 13 The
regressions also contain country-fixed effects (), which control for time invariant countryspecific factors, such as cultural attitudes toward homeownership, and time fixed effects () to capture common global shocks, such as the relatively benign macroeconomic environment that possibly increased the attractiveness of homeownership in the first half of the 2000s (see Li, 2005) . The standard errors are clustered at the country level in order to allow for an arbitrary variance-covariance matrix within each country.
A priori and holding all else equal,  1 is expected to be positive while  2 will be negative if the expansionary impact of financial deregulation on homeownership amongst marginal buyers is smaller in environments with more generous tax relief. The latter may reflect the tendency for generous housing tax policies to be capitalised into real house prices (see Andrews, 2010) , thereby making owner-occupation less affordable for the marginal buyer than otherwise. The inclusion of the interaction term relaxes the slope homogeneity assumption of the conventional fixed effects model, and allows the impact of changes in LTVs on homeownership to vary with the extent of tax relief. The overall impact of a change in the down-payment constraint on homeownership is given by ( 1 +  2 *Taxrelief i ).
The direct effect of Taxrelief, however, cannot be identified since a fixed effects panel estimator is employed and this (time invariant) term would be subsumed in the countryfixed effects.
It is important to recognise that this estimation framework is quite partial, and cannot fully capture more complex dynamic feedback effects between changes in LTVs and other important variables, such as the house price to rent ratio. Moreover, the framework does not control for the influence of compositional changes in the dwelling stock, which have the potential to influence homeownership rates. For instance, in a sample of European countries over the period -2001 , Hilber (2007 finds that a greater proportion of apartments in the dwelling stock tends to raise the likelihood of renting. While both of these factors are likely to be important, data constraints make them difficult to address at present and the results should thus be interpreted with some caution.
Tenure choice and rental regulations
The effect of rental regulations on tenure choice is estimated using a cross-country probit model. Due to the absence of time series data on rental regulations, however, it is not possible to estimate the contribution of rental regulations to the change in aggregate homeownership rates over time. The following probit model is estimated: (5) where  denotes the normal distribution, h denotes household and i denotes country. Pr is the probability that a household will choose to be an owner, given the relevant household characteristics, such as income, education, employment status, summarised in the vector H and country-specific rental regulations, including rent control and security of tenure (P). The vector C controls for other country-specific factors that may impact households' tenure decision, including national household income and urbanisation, while the error term e captures shocks and unobservable factors affecting the households tenure choice and errors are clustered at the country-level. 14 Unfortunately, this estimation framework is unable to address the potential endogeneity between rental market policies and tenure choice, which may arise if existing policies are framed in response to a country's tenure structure. The lack of plausible instruments and time series data on rental regulations make this problem difficult to
address and the results should thus be treated with caution. 15 Moreover, it should be noted that rental regulations -if sufficiently strict -may reduce the supply of rental accommodation and give rise to spillover effects on the demand for homeownership. However, it is not possible to distinguish these unintended supply side effects from the more obvious demand side effects of rental regulations.
Empirical results: non-policy influences on tenure choice
The estimated coefficients from the pooled logistic regression, equation (1), are reported in Table B .1 of Appendix B, while the marginal effects are shown in Table 2 . The coefficients are generally of the expected sign and, across the 12 countries studied, the models -on average -predict individual tenure status correctly approximately 75% of the time, which is comparable with previous studies (see Yates, 2000; Gyourko and Linneman, 1997 ).
The probability of homeownership increases with age, as indicated by the age dummies which are positive and highly significant. Households aged 45-64 years tend to have the highest homeownership propensities, holding other characteristics constant, although this effect tends to vary across countries, as suggested by the different homeownership-age gradients in Figure 1 . In the United States, a head of household aged 45-64 years is 37 percentage points more likely to be a homeowner than where the head is aged 20-24 years, holding all else equal. By contrast, in Germany, the same household type is 54 percentage points more likely to be a homeowner, than younger counterparts.
Relative to the benchmark household of a couple without children, the probability of homeownership tends to be significantly lower for single-headed households, particularly those with children, possibly reflecting unobserved financial resource constraints. 16 Consistent with this, household size tends to be positively related to the probability of homeownership in most of the countries analysed.
The probability of homeownership rises with real household disposable income, though at a diminishing rate, as implied by the negative coefficient on the income squared term. This is broadly consistent with the homeownership-income gradients presented in Households with higher levels of education are more likely to be homeowners. While tertiary education tends to be positively associated with homeownership, this variable is not always statistically significant, possibly reflecting the relatively high correlation with household income. This is particularly the case in continental European economies, such as Austria, Spain and Switzerland. The impact of education on the probability of being a homeowner is particularly strong in the United Kingdom -household heads that are tertiary educated are 16 percentage points more likely to be a homeowner than those without post-secondary education (see Table 2 ). 17
The probability of homeownership is generally lower for immigrant householdsparticularly in Italy and Luxembourg -and minority households and those not proficient in the official language of the country. In the United States, African Americans and Hispanic
Americans are over 15 percentage points less likely to be homeowners than other Americans (Table 2) , which is consistent with existing research (see Gabriel and Rosenthal, 1987, 2004 1995, 2004 1991, 2004 1990, 2004 1992, 2004 Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 1. The regression results are based on a sample that pools data from the most recent household survey available, and data from an earlier period (generally the mid-1990s). The benchmark case against which the estimated coefficients and marginal probabilities are interpreted is a head of household aged 20-24, in a couple relationship with no children, with relatively low education and good health and not from an immigrant/ethnic background. See Appendix B for more details. Source: OECD calculations based on household datasets sourced from LIS, the GSOEP and the American Housing Survey. 1994, 2004 1992, 2004 1994, 2007 1997, 2007 1995, 2003 1997, 2004 1999 Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 1. The regression results are based on a sample that pools data from the most recent household survey available, and data from an earlier period (generally the mid-1990s). The benchmark case against which the estimated coefficients and marginal probabilities are interpreted is a head of household aged 20-24, in a couple relationship with no children, with relatively low education and good health and not from an immigrant/ethnic background. See Appendix B for more details. Source: OECD calculations based on household datasets sourced from LIS, the GSOEP and the American Housing Survey.
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2005). The probability of homeownership also tends to be lower amongst households affected by health problems, possibly reflecting the financial strain associated with illness.
Decomposing the change in aggregate homeownership rates
By combining the coefficient estimates with changes in the average characteristics over time (these changes are discussed in Appendix E of , it is possible to decompose the change in the aggregate homeownership rate as given by equation (3). Figure 5 decomposes the actual change in aggregate homeownership across the two survey years (expressed in percentage points) into three parts: the portion explained by changes in the age structure (the darker bar), the contribution of non-age factors (e.g. household structure, income etc; the lighter bar) and a part unexplained by the model (shaded bar). The latter may reflect changes in economic behaviour and/or the impact of policy settings, which will be investigated in later sections. The 12 countries can be separated into two broad groups according to the observed changes in homeownership rates.
4.1.1. Rising homeownership rates: Austria, Canada, Germany, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States
• Changes in the characteristics of the population generally account for around threequarters of the increase in aggregate homeownership rates in Austria and the United Kingdom.
• In Canada, Germany, Spain, Switzerland and the United States, changes in the characteristics of the population can only account for approximately one-third of the increase in aggregate homeownership rates, implying an important role for other factors.
• For Italy, the explained contribution to the change in the aggregate homeownership rate is negative, suggesting that other factors account for the rise in the aggregate homeownership rate. Table 2 , and show the impact on the probability of a 10% rise in household income from the sample mean level.
Source: OECD calculations based on household datasets sourced from LIS, the GSOEP and the American Housing Survey. been for a shift in the characteristics of the population towards homeownership.
• In Australia and Luxembourg, the aggregate homeownership rate declined by around 2 percentage points over the decade to the mid-2000s. Australia's homeownership rate would have declined further had it not been for a shift in the characteristics of the population towards homeownership. 18 For both countries, the estimates point to a significant decline in the propensity for households to be homeowners, holding household characteristics constant.
The factors that account for the explained change in the aggregate homeownership rate are now briefly discussed. Appendix C contains the detailed decomposition estimates for each country.
Age structure
Across the 12 OECD countries studied, changes in the age structure boosted the aggregate homeownership rate by ¾-1 percentage point on average, and the effect was somewhat larger in Switzerland, Germany, Denmark and Canada. Moreover, while the impact of population ageing was smaller in absolute terms in Australia and the United States, it nonetheless accounts for a significant proportion of the explained change in aggregate homeownership rates. Indeed, the estimates imply that the homeownership rate in Australia and Luxembourg would have declined even further over the period examined, had it not been for changes in age structure. 19
Other explained factors
The decomposition estimates also suggest a role for changes in other household characteristics:
• Changes in household size and structure have generally exerted a downward influence on aggregate homeownership rates, particularly in Germany, Italy and Australia (Table 2) . This generally reflects a rise in the share of single-headed households over the sample period, although in Italy a decline in average household size has also contributed. By contrast, changes in household size and structure have placed upward pressure on aggregate homeownership rates in Austria, Canada and Denmark. 20
• Growth in real household disposable income generally has placed upward pressure on homeownership rates, particularly in Denmark and Finland, which is consistent with the large estimate effect of household income on homeownership probabilities. By contrast, relatively stagnant household incomes have exerted modest downward pressure on aggregate homeownership rates in Germany, Italy and Switzerland.
• With the exception of the United Kingdom, the impact of changes in education on aggregate homeownership rates is generally modest.
• An increase in the socio-economic disadvantaged -proxied by ethnic/immigrant and health status -has generally exerted downward influence on aggregate homeownership rates. This is particularly the case with respect to immigrant households in Italy and
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Luxembourg. In Canada, an increase in the incidence of disability has exerted downward pressure on aggregate homeownership rates. The dot refers to the actual change in the aggregate homeownership rate over the period studied. This can be decomposed into a part explained by changes in household characteristics -which include age structure and other non-age factors such as household structure, household income, and education -and a component which is unexplained by changes in household characteristics.
Source: OECD calculations based on household datasets sourced from LIS, the GSOEP and the American Housing Survey. Table 3 . Contribution of household size and structure to the change in aggregate homeownership
Percentage point contribution, ranked in order of combined effect 
Empirical results: policy influences on tenure choice
Given that shifts in household characteristics can only explain part of the change in aggregate homeownership rates (Figure 5 ), there may be a role for policy factors in explaining these developments. For instance, the increased propensity for homeownership amongst households in the United States, holding their characteristics constant, is consistent with the considerable relaxation of lending standards that made mortgage debt available to households who would not otherwise have been homeowners (Doms and Krainer, 2007) . Accordingly, this section sheds light on the influence of innovations in mortgage markets, tax relief on mortgage debt financing and rental market regulations on homeownership rates. For purposes of continuity, it is important to note that this analysis is generally based on the 12 countries studied in Section 4 plus Belgium, France and the Netherlands (see Appendix A). However, the results are broadly similar if the latter three countries are excluded.
Mortgage market innovations
The results from the cross-country panel estimation of equation (4), which examines the link between changes in the down-payment constraint and homeownership rates amongst marginal buyers, are summarised in Table 4 . Other control variables (including demographic and socio-economic influences on homeownership) are not shown in the table for sake of brevity. To aid interpretation, an estimate of the total impact of financial deregulation evaluated at the sample median value of housing tax relief is also provided. In addition, Figure 6 shows the impact of a 10 percentage point rise in the LTV on the homeownership rate of different groups -relative to the group-specific sample median Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The regression includes country and time fixed effects and control variables, such as real household disposable income, real interest rates, real construction costs, house price-to-rent ratio, share of population aged 25-44 years and the homeownership rates of other income/age groups. The sample includes the following countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States.
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homeownership rate -and how this impact varies with the extent of housing tax relief.
Results are also presented using an index of financial reform (Abiad et al. 2008 ; see Figure 4 in Andrews, 2010) , in place of the LTV, to demonstrate the robustness of the estimates (Columns 2 and 4). While additional analysis suggests the results are also broadly robust to controlling for evolution of the dwelling stock (as measured by the number of dwellings), changes in the composition of the dwelling stock may also matter for homeownership (Hilber, 2007) . Unfortunately, data constraints make it difficult to test the importance of this hypothesis over the period of analysis.
With the above caveat in mind, financial deregulation has been associated with an increase in homeownership among households who are potentially financially constrained, via a reduction in the down-payment constraint. The estimates imply that a 10 percentage point increase in the LTV (i.e. a reduction in the down-payment constraint)
could raise the homeownership rate of households in the second income quartile by 1.9 percentage points, holding all else equal (including the price-to-rent ratio). By comparison, a 10 percentage point increase in the LTV could raise the homeownership rate of households aged 25-34 years in the second income quartile by 4.4 percentage points, Figure 6 . Homeownership, financial deregulation and housing tax relief Impact of a 10 percentage point increase in the maximum LTV ratio on the homeownership rate of households in the second income quartile relative to the sample median homeownership rate
Note: The figure shows the impact of a 10 percentage point -or one standard deviation -rise in the maximum LTV on the homeownership rate of each group. The impact on homeownership is expressed in percentage terms, relative to the sample median homeownership rate for each group, to control for differences in median level of homeownership between each group. The dot shows the estimated impact of an increase in the LTV on the groupspecific homeownership rate when tax relief on mortgage debt financing is set equal to the sample median level. The upper (lower) bound shows the estimated impact when tax relief is set at 0.5 standard deviations below (above) the sample median level. When Tax relief is set to the sample median, the overall impact coefficient on LTV is 0.19 for all households and 0.44 for those aged 25-34 years (see columns 1 and 3 of Table 3 ). In turn, these coefficients are used to construct the following policy experiments: i) All households in the second income quartile: a 10 percentage point rise in the LTV is associated with a 1.9 percentage point rise in the group-specific homeownership rate. This is equivalent to a 3.4% rise -as indicated by the dotrelative to the group-specific sample median homeownership rate of 55.6%. ii) Households aged 25-34 years in the second income quartile: a 10 percentage point rise in the LTV is associated with a 4.4 percentage point rise in the group-specific homeownership rate. This is equivalent to a 12.4% rise -as indicated by the dot -relative to the group-specific sample median homeownership rate of 35.1%. Figure 14 of Andrews, Caldera Sánchez and Johansson (2011) and are sourced from Chiuri and Jappelli (2003) , Catte et al. (2004) 
Sources: LIS and OECD calculations. LTVs are plotted in
228
holding all else equal. This is consistent with the idea that the down-payment constraint particularly affects younger households, who have had less time to accumulate a deposit.
Back of the envelope calculations suggest that the impact of a relaxation in the downpayment constraint on aggregate homeownership rates is in the same ballpark as the impact of population ageing on aggregate homeownership rates. Overall, the estimates imply that a 10 percentage point increase in the maximum LTV could be associated with a 0.5 percentage point increase in the aggregate homeownership from a sample median aggregate homeownership rate of 63.6%. In comparison, changes in the age structure boosted the aggregate homeownership rate by ¾-1 percentage point on average across the 12 OECD countries studied.
Tax relief on mortgage debt financing
The impact of mortgage market innovations on homeownership, however, is also influenced by the extent of tax relief for mortgage debt financing. The interaction between LTV and Taxrelief is negative and significant, which suggests that in countries with more generous tax relief on debt financing, the expansionary impact of an increase in the LTV ratio on the homeownership rate of financially-constrained households is smaller. In a typical OECD country, a 10 percentage point increase in the LTV is associated with a 4.4 percentage point rise in the homeownership rate of households aged 25-34 years in the second quartile. In a country where tax relief is half a standard deviation more generous, however, the impact is only 3.2 percentage points.
Thus, tax reliefs can distort the impact of other policies such as mortgage market innovations, and indirectly crowd-out financially constrained households from homeownership. This may reflect the greater tendency for house price capitalisation of demand shocks to occur in countries where housing tax relief is generous (see Andrews, 2010) . In such environments, it is possible that the increase in the required deposit -due to higher real house prices -may have offset the easing of the down-payment constraint, thereby reducing housing affordability for the marginal buyer. 21 This interpretation is consistent with studies that show that higher real house prices can reduce homeownership rates amongst marginal buyers, by discouraging saving for a deposit and/ or significantly increasing the period required to save for a deposit (Engelhardt, 1997; Engelhardt and Mayer, 1988) .
Of course, mortgage market innovations tend to have a direct effect on real house prices, irrespective of housing taxation arrangements, which may have offset the easing of the down-payment constraint on homeownership. For example, Andrews (2010) estimates that financial deregulation has boosted real prices by as much as 30% in the average OECD country over recent decades. The extent to which this reduces affordability for the marginal buyer, however, also depends on the extent to which housing supply responds, with the evidence suggesting that the impact of financial deregulation on house prices is smaller in environments where housing supply is more responsive to price developments (see Andrews, 2010; Favara and Imbs, 2009 ). Indeed, additional modelling (not presented here) suggests that the adverse affect of generous housing tax policies on homeownership is more acute in countries with more rigid housing supply, which is consistent with existing evidence from the United States (Toder et al. 2010 ). This hypothesis is tested by including a triple interaction term (Financial Reform*Taxrelief*Supplyelasticity) in the estimation framework outlined above (estimates of the elasticity of housing supply are sourced from Caldera- . However, this interaction term is not 229 always significant, especially in the specifications that include the LTV in place of the Financial Reform Index.
Since the direct effect of tax relief on the homeownership rate of households in the second income quartile (i.e. the marginal buyer) is not modelled, it is possible that this effect -to the extent it is positive -could offset the indirect effect identified above. 22 However, the direct effect is likely to be economically small since tax reliefs for debt financing costs generally take the form of a deduction against earned income, which is worth less to households in the second income quartile than to high-income earners. This is supported by data from the United States, which show that the bulk of the value of the mortgage interest deduction is claimed by a relatively small fraction of households with high incomes (Figure 7 ). For example, while over half of all filed tax returns in 2003 pertained to adjustable gross incomes of less than 30 000 USD, this income bracket accounted for just 9% of the value of mortgage interest deductions. By contrast, taxpayers with adjustable gross incomes over 75 000 USD claimed 54% of the value of home mortgage interest deductions, despite only accounting for 16% of tax filers.
Rental market regulations
Results also suggest a role for rental market regulations in influencing tenure choice, with stricter rent regulation and greater tenant protection associated with lower Per cent of all tax returns in each income bracket Per cent of the value of the home mortgage interest deduction claimed by each income bracket 230 probability to be a homeowner in the sample of countries studied. The results from the probit estimation of equation (5) reported in Table 4 show that 23 :
• Higher rent controls, measured by the rent control index (column 1) are associated with lower probability of homeownership. Similarly, higher security of tenure is also associated with lower homeownership (column 2).
• The estimates imply that decreasing rent control from the average observed in the sample of countries by ½ a standard deviation (or to the level in Ireland) would raise average homeownership by 4 percentage points. Lowering the security of tenure by ½ a standard deviation would, in turn, increase average homeownership by 2 percentage points.
Rental market regulations may impose costs, however, to the extent that they are capitalised into housing costs and undermine flexibility in the housing market. Across OECD countries, residential mobility tends to be lower -all else equal -in countries where rental market regulations are stricter, as measured by the degree of rent control and security of tenure (see Caldera . This may reflect the reluctance of sitting tenants in heavy regulated dwellings to move and give up their belowmarket rents.
Conclusion
The results highlight the contribution of changes in demographic, socio-economic and selected policy variables to explaining patterns in aggregate homeownership rates across OECD countries over recent decades. Since the mid 1990s, part of the change in homeownership rates can be explained by changes in household characteristics. In some of the countries studied, population ageing and increases in real household incomes can each account for around 1 percentage point of the rise in aggregate homeownership rates, although the contribution of these factors can vary significantly across countries. Shifts in household characteristics, however, cannot account for all of the change, leaving a potential role for public policy in explaining developments in homeownership rates.
Innovations in mortgage markets appear to have boosted aggregate homeownership rates, 1. This analysis covers the following countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. Regressions include control variables on household characteristics such as real household disposable income, age, education, employment status, household size, cohabitation status; as well as controls for the degree of urbanisation and total national income. Values are marginal effects. The coefficients correspond to the impact of one unit change in the probability to be a homeowner estimated at the mean of the independent variables. The sample is restricted to individuals who are the head of the household and aged 24-66 to avoid the results being influenced by atypical tenureship. The estimates are weighted by individual sampling probability. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0. 
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and rough estimates suggest that this effect appears to be broadly comparable with the impact of population ageing. However, there is some evidence that the impact of mortgage market innovations has been distorted by generous housing tax relief, especially for lower income households due to the resulting increase in house prices. The evidence also suggests that rental market regulations impact homeownership by making renting more attractive, but these policies also carry costs.
To the extent that boosting homeownership is a public policy goal in some OECD countries, these results highlight some of the unintended consequences of current housing tax arrangements in many OECD countries. Of course, higher homeownership rates may not necessarily be desirable to the extent that they may constrain residential and labour mobility (see Caldera . Moreover, while alleviating credit constraints is generally desirable, it is important to acknowledge that the relaxation in lending standards can go too far, especially if this is associated with insufficient regulatory supervision as illustrated by recent developments in the United States (see Andrews, Caldera Sánchez and Johansson, 2011) . 2. For a discussion on housing taxation, see Andrews, Caldera Sánchez and Johansson (2011) .
The study uses various household-level micro datasets, such as the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS), American Housing Survey (AHS), German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) and the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC)
. While a number of data sources are utilised to improve country coverage, coverage still varies significantly between the three main empirical strategies owing to the specific data requirements of each approach (see Appendix A).
4. Asymmetric information and other credit market friction mean that lenders often require equity contributions (i.e. a down-payment) from borrowers when granting a home mortgage loan.
5. Similarly, Duca and Rosenthal (1994) found that borrowing constraints lowered the United States homeownership rate by around 8 percentage points, disproportionately affecting younger households.
6. Regulatory ceilings on LTV ratios have tended to be particularly binding in Germany, while in other countries, LTVs are effectively capped by lengthy legal procedures in the event of default (Catte et al. 2004 ).
7. The specific focus on tax relief to debt financing is also appropriate, given the important changes that have taken place in mortgage markets in OECD countries over recent decades.
8. Tax relief on mortgage debt financing also encourages households (particularly those with high incomes) to hold more debt than otherwise (Hendershott et al. 2002) .
9. This is the expression for the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition based on a linear regression. To account for the binary dependent variable and the non-linear nature of equation (1), however, a more involved non-linear procedure proposed by Fairlie (1999) is adopted, although the intuition is essentially the same as in the linear case. See Appendix C of for more details.
10. This is obtained by deflating the nominal income measure contained in the survey by the consumer price index.
11. To the extent that housing costs tend to be higher in large cities, regional dummies may provide a reasonable proxy for relative house prices.
12. In the context of equation (4), this implies that j = 2 and a separate model is estimated for both groups.
13. For example, if the homeownership rate of the other income quartiles is not held constant, then it is possible that a rise in the LTV could increase HO Quartile2 at the expense of another income quartile, thereby making inferences about the impact on the aggregate homeownership rate difficult.
14. The model does not include regional-fixed effects because data on household location are not available for more than half of the countries in the sample.
15. A possible solution is to include country-fixed effects to control for time-invariant, countryspecific factors. However, since the policy variables in equation (5) are only measured at a single point, their impact on tenure could no longer be identified since they would be subsumed in the country-fixed effects.
16. In half of the countries studied, there tends to be little difference between the probability of homeownership for couple-headed households with children compared with those without. While it is not possible to separate household structure into the same categories for the United States, the probability of homeownership tends to be higher amongst married households and households where the head has been previously married.
17. By contrast, the estimates from the tenure choice equation for Australia -which is most comparable with the United Kingdom -suggest a much smaller impact of education on the probability to be a homeowner. For example, households with tertiary and associate-level (i.e. trade) qualifications in Australia are only 4 percentage points and 7 percentage points more likely to be homeowners than those without post-secondary education.
18. Additional modelling (not shown) based on the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia Survey suggests a further unexplained decline in Australia's homeownership rate up until 2007.
19. The decomposition estimates suggest that changes in the age structure had little impact on the aggregate homeownership rate in Spain. This reflects the fact that while the average age increased by over one year in Spain over the period studied, the share of households in the 45-64 age bracket -the group with the highest propensity to be homeowners according to the tenure choice equation -declined somewhat. This result is robust to using different age brackets in the tenure choice estimation.
20. In Canada, the positive contribution from household structure reflects a decline in single-headed households coupled with a negative marginal impact of being a single-headed household on homeownership propensities (Table 2) .
21. For instance. Battelino (2009) notes that a particular problem for first-home owners in Australia is that the rise in the ratio of house prices to income has substantially increased the deposit required to access the market.
22. The direct effect of tax relief for debt financing costs on homeownership is not modelled since the variable used to proxy tax relief is time invariant and is thus subsumed in the country-fixed effects.
23. The control variables, omitted from the table for the sake of brevity and listed at the bottom of Table 3 are generally of the expected sign and significance. The results are also robust to controlling for cross-country differences in the share of private rentals in the housing stock.
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APPENDIX A
Data Sources
The data sources and country coverage varies somewhat according to the empirical approach. This Appendix provides a further elaboration on these issues. 2. While survey data for these countries are available, the tenure choice equations tend to perform poorly for Eastern European countries -possibly due to the very high rates of homeownership, which make it difficult to distinguish the impact of household characteristics on homeownership.
Stylised facts and homeownership decomposition
3. It is not possible to directly access the various LIS household surveys due to confidentiality restrictions. Instead, the data are accessed by sending a statistical code to a server, and estimation results are subsequently returned. This process effectively places computational limits on the estimation, which means that it is very cumbersome to estimate models that require the pooling of numerous households datasets.
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APPENDIX B
Empirical Results
The regression results in Table B .1 are based on a sample that pools data from the most recent household survey available, and data from an earlier period (generally the mid-1990s). The benchmark case against which the estimated coefficients and marginal probabilities are interpreted is a head of household aged 20-24, in a couple relationship with no children, with relatively low education and good health and not from an immigrant/ethnic background.
In initial specifications for Australia, Denmark, Spain and the United Kingdom, the coefficient on household size was negative. This appears to reflect a multicollinearity problem between household size and household structure, so household size was excluded from the baseline tenure choice equation. For Austria, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Spain and Switzerland, data constraints mean that it is only possible to assess the relationship between education and homeownership using a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the household head has tertiary education. For Australia, Canada, Germany, Luxembourg, the United Kingdom and the United States, more detailed data on the educational level of the household head are available. For approximately one-half of the countries modelled, the interaction terms between income and age/household structure were insignificant and, thus, excluded from the baseline regression, while regional dummies are included in two-thirds of the countries studied. 1987, 2004 1995, 2004 1991, 2004 1990, 2004 1992, 2004 1994, 2004 1992, 2004 1994, 2007 1997, 2007 1995, 2003 1997, 2004 1999, 2004 Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Sources: OECD, LIS, German socioeconomic Panel and American Housing Survey.
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APPENDIX C
Detailed Decomposition Results
The following charts isolate the contribution of each explanatory variable included in the tenure choice equation to the change in the homeownership rate. Together, these characteristics sum to the total explained column. For some countries, the characteristics do not perfectly sum to the total explained bar, because variables that make a very small contribution (such as the regional dummies or the male household head dummy) are generally excluded for presentational purposes. 
